Canada’s TSB Points to Unstable Approach in MU2 Accident

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada’s final report of the March 2016 crash of a U.S-registered MU2 at Îles-de-la-Madeleine Airport (CYGR), Quebec, points to a pilot who let the aircraft get way ahead of him. Plagued by a high workload and unable to manage the aircraft’s energy state, the approach became unstable and the pilot eventually lost control of the airplane. Just a few hundred feet above the ground, the pilot added full power inducing an upset that caused the aircraft to enter a severe right roll. At no time during the approach did the pilot ever attempt a missed approach. Seven people, including the pilot, perished in the accident.

The Board said, “It is unlikely that the pilot’s flight skills and procedures were sufficiently practiced to ensure his proficiency as the pilot-in-command for single-pilot operation on the MU2B for the conditions experienced during the occurrence flight.”

While the pilot held an ATP certificate, the MU2 was the first truly high-performance aircraft he’d ever flown. The 2,500-hour pilot had logged approximately 125 hours in the MU2, 100 of which was under supervision required to meet insurance requirements. He’d flown the aircraft 19.1 hours in the past 90 days and just 4.3 in the 30 days prior to the accident.

The aircraft carried a General Aviation Safety Network34 Wi-Flight GTA02 FDR system based on a smartphone app that recorded the conversations during the flight used in the accident analysis. Another pilot manned the right seat, although he was unfamiliar with the MU2.

Following the sequence of events beginning 150 nm from the destination, the final minutes of the flight build a picture of a pilot who acted more like someone watching the airplane operate from a distance, than a pilot in command. While still about 145 nm from CYGR, the pilot advised the passenger-pilot he was delaying the descent to save fuel. Investigators believe the aircraft was carrying approximately 1,000 pounds (165 gal.) at the moment of impact. During the descent, the pilot also mentioned a 40-knot tailwind.

Because they would be closer to CYGR than originally planned, the pilot indicated that the aircraft would have to descend at 250 KIAS, which is the aircraft’s maximum operating limit speed (VMO). He later indicated that, in order to minimize time spent in cloud and avoid any icing, the descent would again be delayed. At 64 nm from CYGR, Moncton Center gave the pilot his discretion to 9,000 feet. At 51 nm, the pilot began a gradual descent of approximately 800 fpm, although it eventually reached 1,800 fpm and finally 2,000 fpm.

As the MU2 proceeded to the initial approach waypoint DAVAK, updated weather informed him the wind was 070° at 19 knots, gusting 24 knots, with 2 sm visibility. The ceiling reported was a broken layer at 200 feet and an overcast at 800. This should have caused a reaction by the pilot since the RNAV approach was now below minimums, although he said nothing. Through 12,000 feet the aircraft was indicating 245 knots and the power was reduced enough to cause the gear warning horn to sound, which the pilot silenced.

Once ATC cleared the MU2 for the approach, the pilot was asked to contact CYGR FSS. The passenger-pilot operating the radios told the FSS the aircraft was only 4.7 miles from DAVAK at 6,800 feet, 3,800 feet above the required 3,000-foot crossing altitude. Still indicating 240 knots in a 2,500-fpm descent, the aircraft crossed the initial fix 1,500 feet high while still descending at 1,600 fpm and nearly 100 knots faster than the recommended 140 knot approach speed. Because he was already behind the airplane, the pilot skipped both the approach and the before-landing checklist.

(Evangle Luo of TTFLY shared with you)